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Abstract: When making social decisions (e.g. voting, donating, etc.), individuals consider the
expectations of the groups with which they identify. These expectations are injunctive social
norms, shared beliefs about what constitutes appropriate behavior for members of the identity
group, and individuals’ choices reflect trade-offs between adherence to these norms and their
other preferences. Using an incentivized lab experiment, we show that when individuals pay a
personal cost as a consequence of avoiding a group norm violation, they subsequently view the
norm as stronger and become more willing to punish/reward others with the same identity for
violating/complying with the norm than if they did not experience such a cost. Further, such
individuals view other norms associated with the identity as stronger. In this way, costly
compliance with a norm may have a reinforcing effect on identity based norms.
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Introduction
It is now a commonplace that economists should take into account the ways in which a person’s
social identities influences their behavior (see most prominently, Akerlof and Kranton 2001).
Extensive experimental evidence supports the view that identity matters for behavior, showing
that even induced minimal group identities, as well as natural identities, can impact generosity,
cooperation, coordination, conflict, punishment and a host of other economic decisions (see
e.g. Chen and Li 2009, as well as Chen and Mengel 2016 and the papers cited therein). An
important channel through which social (group) identities shape behavior is via (injunctive)
norms.1 Members of an identity group have normative expectations about what other group
members ought to do (as members of the group), and a desire to adhere to group norms leads
individuals to adjust their behavior to be norm-consistent, sometimes incurring costs in order
to follow group norms.2
Here we explore the possibility that there is a psychological mechanism that may make normfollowing behavior self-reinforcing. With an incentivized experiment, we test a mechanism
through which costly compliance with the norms of one’s identity group increases the strength
of the identity and its related norms. The mechanism we study is known as “effort justification”
and emerges from the psychology literature on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The idea
is simple – when individuals weigh norm-compliance against self-interest, they will sometimes
incur costs in the service of a group norm. Incurring such costs can induce a form of dissonance
in which the individual becomes aware of the mutual incompatibility of their personal interests
and the dictates of their identity group, yielding psychological discomfort. Aronson and Mills
(1959) propose that such dissonance may sometimes be overcome via “effort justification”,
with individuals persuading themselves that in fact the norm following was even more valuable
1

Injunctive norms, which describe shared beliefs about what someone ought to do, are contrasted to descriptive
norms, which describe observed patterns of behavior (Cialdini and Trost 1998). We focus on the former, but to
avoid jargon, we simply refer to these as norms from this point on.
2
This account coheres with the rapidly growing literature on the role of norms in shaping social behavior, in which
individuals are modeled as varying in the degree to which they care about following commonly known norms and
trading off the desire to follow norms against own interests (e.g. Lopez-Perez 2008, Kessler and Leider 2012,
Krupka and Weber 2013, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov 2016, Pickup et al. 2016). Here we simply highlight that
norms may be defined at the level of the identity group (as argued by Akerlof and Kranton 2001), rather than
globally, as is implicitly assumed in the literature.
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than they initially believed. The implication of this mechanism is that those who incur a cost to
comply with group norms will subsequently be more likely to incur related costs again.
Our experiment provides a clean test of this theory and generates evidence supporting this
account. Our design allows subjects to endogenously choose whether to follow a group norm,
even though they know it may be costly to do so, and then randomizes whether norm-following
is actually costly for those who elect to comply. By randomly assigning the cost, conditional on
the decision to adhere to the norm, we can identify a causal effect of incurring a cost. We show
that when individuals (randomly) pay a personal cost as a consequence of norm following, they
subsequently view the norm as stronger and become more willing to punish/reward others
with the same identity for violating/complying with the norm than if they did not (randomly)
experience such a cost. Further, such individuals view other norms associated with the identity
as stronger. In this way, costly compliance with a norm may have a reinforcing effect on identity
based norms.

Groups, Identities, Norms and Effort Justification
A social group is defined as “two or more individuals who share a common social identification
of themselves or […] perceive themselves to be members of the same social category." (Turner
1982: 15). A social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept that arise from
his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and
emotional significance attached to the membership” (Tajfel 1978: 63). From this perspective,
behaviors – one’s own or those of others in one’s group – that are not consistent with one’s
identity are threatening to one’s self-concept. They can cause psychological distress.
As a consequence of the potential psychological cost of violating one’s social identity,
individuals consider how members of the groups with which they identify are expected to
behave. These expectations are norms, the rules of behavior that we expect members of our
group to follow and believe others in our group will expect us to follow in kind (Bicchieri 2006;
Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2001). It has long been understood that social identities come with
norms of behavior (Sherif 1967; Cooper et al. 2001; Spencer et al. 1998; Turner et al. 1987,
3

Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Norms are important, as they allow groups to coordinate and
cooperate. However, norms have this power because they cannot easily be pushed aside when
they are inconvenient for the individual, and following the norms of one’s identity is not always
fully compatible with satisfying one’s other preferences. As Sherif and Sherif (1953, pg. 175)
note, there is potential for conflict between group-based norms, and both idiosyncratic
personal preferences and preferences based on the norms of other group identities. The
references in footnote 1 are examples of how economists have begun to model norm-driven
behavior; the key implication is that individuals may face tradeoffs between following norms on
the one hand and their other interests on the other. If norms are sufficiently important, other
interests may sometimes be sacrificed.
Our experiment focuses on the influence of political identities. Political identities (partisan,
ideological, etc.) are an important kind of social identity (Green et al. 2002; Huddy et al. 2015;
Achen and Bartels 2016; Malka and Lelkes 2010), and political identity groups have normative
expectations like any other group. Thus norms help to shape political decisions such as
donations and voting via the mechanism described above. For example, the identity
"Republican" in the US is normatively associated with increased restrictions on abortion.
Nevertheless, many individuals who identify as Republican may personally prefer restrictions
not be increased. As another example, an individual may believe that as a “conservative” they
should oppose funding for global sexual and reproductive rights programs but believe that as a
woman they should support these rights for women across the globe. When such conflicts with
the individual’s political identity arise, voting behavior reflects this tension, with some
individuals putting sufficient weight on group norms to vote against their other preferences.
Individuals’ vote choices thus reflect trade-offs between adherence to political norms on one
hand and personal preferences and other group norms on the other (Pickup et al. 2016).
Under this view, when an individual incurs a cost on behalf of an identity (McConnell et al.
2017), this is the consequence of privileging the norm in the trade-off between norm
compliance and other preferences. The consequence of incurring such a cost may be that the
individual suffers from a form of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The individual finds
herself in a position of having to justify to herself why she chose to incur a cost. One way she
4

can do this is to engage in “effort justification”. Aronson and Mills (1959) suggested that there
are two possible psychological processes by which an individual can reduce the cognitive
dissonance associated with experiencing a cost due to a choice made. The first is to downplay
the cost incurred. When this cannot be done, the individual increases the perceived value of
the choice made in order to justify the cost. This is effort justification. It can explain why shared
experiences of suffering or of struggling toward a common goal can induce strong feelings of
group identity and has even been used to explain how hazing conducted by some Greek Letter
Organizations, athletics teams, military organizations, etc. is effective at increasing loyalty to
the group. The mechanism of effort justification predicts that experiencing a cost (e.g., in the
form of effort and/or humiliation) in order to join or remain part of a group will increase the
individual’s attachment to the group and its norms. Thus when individuals incur costs in order
to comply with the norms of their political identity, effort justification predicts they will magnify
the importance of the group and the associated norms in subsequent decisions. They persuade
themselves that their decision truly was the right and necessary one in light of the importance
of the group and in the process strengthen the norm. The result is that costly compliance with a
norm can increase the strength of the group norm and increase (future) adherence to the norm
itself. Group norm compliance is self-reinforcing.
Our research question then is: What are the effects of experiencing a cost due to following a
group norm? Our hypotheses are that: 1) complying with a group norm at a cost reinforces that
group norm; and 2) complying with a group norm at a cost reinforces other norms of the group.

Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to test whether subjects who incur costs in order to follow an
identity based norm will be more likely than those who incur no cost to support and enforce
that (and other group) norms. Our experiment uses subjects’ self-reported partisan and
ideological identities. It also uses our foreknowledge of the norms regarding support for
(opposition toward) the Affordable Care Act and restrictions on immigration that are associated
with those identities. This allows us to construct choices in which subjects face a trade-off
5

between norm-following and their (expected) monetary earnings. Specifically, in our
experiment a subject can either receive a certain payoff of $6 for taking a norm-inconsistent
action or receive an uncertain lottery that is equally likely to pay $6 or $2 for taking a normconsistent action.
Our identification strategy relies on comparisons of subjects who took norm-consistent actions
and differ only in whether they received a favourable lottery outcome and/or an unfavourable
lottery outcome. Those whose lottery outcomes were unfavourable suffered a cost in order to
follow the norm, and thus we would expect that they are more willing to punish norm-violators,
reward norm-followers and report stronger normative expectations of others.
The experiment unfolds as follows (see Table 1 for a summary). Prior to the experiment,
subjects completed a questionnaire in which they indicated their partisan (or ideological
identity). These experiments were conducted in the US, so we know whether subjects identify
as Democrats or Republicans in the Partisanship treatment and whether they identify as liberals
or conservatives in the Ideology treatment. On the basis of these self-reports, we recruited
subjects to the lab and assigned them to different tasks where they answered questions and
made decisions related to either the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare treatment) or
immigration policy (Immigration treatment). We chose these policies because we believe they
are the focus of a salient divide between Democrats and Republicans (and between liberals and
conservatives) in contemporary American politics.
Upon arrival to the lab, subjects confirm their self-reported identity. The experiment consists of
5 tasks, two of which are incentivized. Task 1 asks for subjects’ beliefs about the extent to
which other members of their own identity group would approve or disapprove if they chose to
advocate for norm-inconsistent policies. We also ask how much the subject would approve or
disapprove if they learned that others in their identity group advocated norm-inconsistent
policies. This gives us a measure of subjects’ beliefs about the norms of their identity group. For
instance, in our Immigration-Partisanship treatment a self-identified Democrat would be asked
how much they believe other Democrats would approve if they advocated in favour of reducing
immigration. We anticipate that such advocacy will be perceived as a norm violation and thus
6

will result in disapproval. This task also serves to prime the individual’s political identity and the
norm of the identity regarding a specific policy (a policy norm).
Table 1: Structure of the Experiment

Pre-Experiment
Questionnaire

Subjects report
their partisan
(ideological)
identity and this
is used to assign
them to
treatment. This
occurs days
before the
experiment.

Task 1:

Task 2:

Task 3:

Task 4:

Task 5:

Policy Norm
Elicitation

Letter-writing
Decision

Vote Norm
Elicitation

Incentivized Policy
Norm Elicitation

Subjects confirm
their selfreported
identity.
Subjects report
beliefs about
other identity
group members’
and own
approval for
norminconsistent
behavior.

Subjects
choose their
expected
payoff by
deciding
whether to
send normconsistent ($2
or $6 lottery)
or norminconsistent
letters ($6).
They must sign
the letters,
and address
and stamp the
envelopes.

Subjects learn
the payoff of
their decision
(which is
uncertain only if
they chose
norm-consistent
letters). Then
we ask them
their beliefs
about other
identity group
members’ and
own approval of
voting for a
candidate of the
opposite
identity group.

Subjects receive an
add’l $6. Using the
strategy method,
subjects indicate
their willingness to
punish/reward
norm-consistent
and norminconsistent letter
writers from both
their own and the
other group (up to
$1.5, each $1
translates to
reward/punishment
of $3). They are
then matched with
one other subject in
the experiment.

Beliefs about
Others’ NormFollowing
Subjects report
how likely
others of the
same group
were to write
normconsistent and
norminconsistent
letters.
Outcomes are
revealed.
Subjects are
paid and
dismissed.

Task 2 provides subjects with an incentivized choice between a norm-inconsistent and a normconsistent action. Specifically, subjects are told that they will have to sign, address, stamp and
fill ten envelopes with advocacy letters, which will be mailed to ten different members of the
US Congress after the experiment. These letters either advocate for or against a policy (the
Affordable Care Act or restrictions on immigration). Subjects are offered $6 for sure if they
choose to send letters that are norm-inconsistent. Subjects are told they will receive a lottery
payment that yields $2 or $6 with equal probability if they choose to send letters that are
norm-consistent. Subjects do not learn the outcome of the lottery until they have made their
decision and completed the task. Keeping with the example above, this means that a self-
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identified Democrat in the Immigration-Partisanship treatment is offered the choice between
sending letters advocating for increasing restrictions on immigration and receiving $6 for sure
or else sending letters advocating for reducing restrictions on immigration and receiving the
lottery payment. After making their choices, subjects were given time to complete the task
(typically 15 minutes). Once the monitor has determined that the task is complete and the
letters have been correctly addressed and stamped, the subjects are given a password that
allows them to go on to Task 3.3
At the outset of Task 3, subjects are told their payoff based on their choice (and when
applicable the outcome of the lottery) in Task 2. Task 3 then asks subjects another question
intended to measure the strength of identity-driven norms. Specifically, subjects are asked how
much they believe other members of their identity group would approve or disapprove if they
voted for a candidate from the other party (or ideology) in the next federal election. We also
ask subjects how much they would approve or disapprove if they learned that another member
of their identity group voted for the opposite group. Again, following the example, this means
that a Democrat would be asked how much they believe other Democrats would approve or
disapprove if they voted for a Republican in the next federal election. Then they would be
asked how much they would approve if they learned that another Democrat voted for a
Republican in the next federal election. These questions measure an identity related norm –
specifically, the norm against voting for the other side (a vote norm).
Task 4 provides an incentivized measure of norm-strength. This is the norm regarding the policy
they were asked to support or oppose in their letters. Specifically, we once again remind
subjects of their decision and earnings from Task 2, and then we use the strategy method to
elicit willingness to punish/reward others who chose to send norm-consistent or norminconsistent letters in Task 2. All subjects are told that they have been allocated an additional
$6 at the start of Task 4. They are then told that they can spend money to punish and reward
others. Specifically, for each $0.01 that they spend on punishment they can reduce the payoff

3

All but one participant completed the task. One subject asked to have their data withdrawn after making their
choice in Task 2 because, to paraphrase, they didn’t realize that we would actually have them send letters to
Congress.
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of another subject by $0.03, or for each $0.01 that they spend on reward, they can increase the
payoff of another subject by $0.03. Subjects are told that they will be matched with one other
person in the room at the end of the experiment at random. This means that their
punishment/reward decision

will impact that person’s payoff and that person’s

punishment/reward decision will impact their own payoff. They are asked how much they
would like to punish or reward that individual depending on that individual’s choice to send
norm-consistent or -inconsistent letters.
In order to avoid deceiving subjects while also collecting data on our primary quantities of
interest (punishment/reward of norm-inconsistent members of their own group), we employ
the strategy method to get punishment/reward decisions for all possible subject types with
whom they might be matched. That is, we ask subjects to make punish/reward decisions for
each of the four possible cases:
1. a Democrat (or liberal) who sent norm-consistent letters (i.e. pro-ACA or proimmigration;
2. a Democrat (or liberal) who sent norm-inconsistent letters (i.e. anti-ACA or antiimmigration);
3. a Republican (or conservative) who sent norm-consistent letters (i.e. anti-ACA or antiimmigration); and
4. a Republican (or conservative) who sent norm-inconsistent letters (i.e. pro-ACA or proimmigration).
Participants can spend a maximum of $1.50 since this ensures that their worst-case earnings
from this Task are $0 (i.e. if they spend $1.50 punishing or rewarding others and are punished
maximally for $4.50). With this task we seek to measure whether subjects who have incurred a
cost by following the norm, i.e. have sent norm-consistent letters and received the lower
lottery payoff of $2, are more likely to punish members of their group who were norminconsistent and reward members of their group who were norm-consistent. The comparison
group is those that also selected the norm-consistent letters but did not experience a cost.
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Task 5 asks subjects how likely it is that a member of their own group chose to send each kind
of letter. This allows us to address the possible concern that the relevant punishment/reward
decisions were made with the expectation that they would not actually have consequences. In
other words, if a subject believes that others in their group are extremely unlikely to send
norm-inconsistent letters, then their punishment/reward decision might not be informative.
After Task 5, subjects are matched at random with another subject in the room, their final
payoffs are calculated and displayed on their screen, and then they complete a short
demographic questionnaire and are called over one-by-one for payment.
In total 206 subjects participated in 10 total experimental sessions, containing between 10 and
30 subjects each, depending on sign-up and show-up rates. Overall, we found it easier to recruit
Democrats and liberals than to recruit Republicans and conservatives, and as a consequence
less than 40% of the sample consists of members of the latter two identity groups. Of the 206
subjects, 136 were liberals or Democrats and 70 were conservatives or Republicans (see Table
2). During the experimental sessions, 87 of the liberals/Democrats had their ideological identity
primed and 49 had their partisan identity primed. Meanwhile, 31 of the
conservative/Republicans had their ideological identity primed and 39 had their partisan
identity primed. Sessions lasted on average 45 minutes, and subjects were paid an average of
17.90 dollars, including a $7 payment for arriving on time. Instructions were delivered onscreen via zTree and were self-paced, since the content was personalized by the subject’s selfreported partisan or ideological identity. A monitor answered any questions that arose
privately. Due to a software error, we were unable to collect demographic questionnaire data
on the 23 subjects in our first session. We collected no additional unreported data and no pilot
sessions.
Table 2: Identity Distribution of Participants

Treatment
Ideology identity
Partisan identity
Total

Participant Identity
liberal/Democrat
conservative/Republican
87
31
49
39
136
70
10

Results
Our theory applies to individuals that experience a cost because they chose to comply with the
norms of their identity. This requires individuals to perceive such norms. Do individuals perceive
group norms? The first thing we explore is whether individuals do in fact perceive a group norm
for the issue on which they will be asked to experience a cost. This norm is measured as: 1) the
(dis)approval that individuals expect others with the same identity to express towards them if
they chose to violate the norm; and 2) the (dis)approval that individuals would express to
others with the same identity that chose to violate the norm.
Figure 1 gives the distribution of expected approval (from 0 to 10) by others for violating the
norm. We see that for liberals/Democrats that the vast majority (88.2%) would expect
disapproval. For conservatives/Republicans, again a majority would expect disapproval but
there is a significant minority (22.9%) that would not. Figure 2 gives the distribution of approval
of others for violating the norm. Again, the vast majority of liberals/Democrats (77.21) would
disapprove. Among conservatives/Republicans those that would approve are roughly equal
with those that would disapprove, although the magnitude of disapproval is stronger.
It is clear that liberals and Democrats perceive a norm against supporting the issues for which
they are asked to experience a cost (ACA and immigration). There is some but weak evidence
that conservatives and Republicans also perceive a norm.

Figure 1: (Dis)approval by others for violating the norm
Other Liberals/Democrats Approval of
You Advocating Norm Inconsistent Position

Other Conservative/Republicans Approval of
You Advocating Norm Inconsistent Position
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Figure 2: (Dis)approval of others for violating the norm
Your Approval of Other
Conservative/Republicans Advocating Norm
Inconsistent Position

10
Percent

10

5

5
0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
0

Percent

15

15

20

Your Approval of Other Liberals/Democrats
Advocating Norm Inconsistent Position

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Again, our theory applies to individuals that experience a cost due to group norm compliance.
How many individuals followed the norm despite the potential cost of doing so? Overall, 76.5
percent of liberals/Democrats (74.7/79.6) chose the norm consistent task, while only 37.14
percent of conservatives/Republicans (32.3/41.0) did the same. And, of those that perceived a
norm (gave a score less than five on both of the two norm questions), 87.21 percent of
liberals/Democrats chose the norm consistent task, while 64.71 percent of
conservatives/Republicans did the same. This means that of the original 136
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liberals/Democrats, 85 (63%) perceived a norm and followed it at a cost. Meanwhile, of the
original 70 conservative/Republicans, 14 (20%) perceived a norm and followed it at a cost.
It is not clear if we have just chosen the wrong issues for conservatives/Republicans or
conservatives/Republicans are less likely to perceive and follow group norms (at a cost) or if the
individuals that identified as conservative/Republican in our sample are not typical of the group
with which they identify. Whatever the explanation, we do not have enough conservatives and
Republicans perceiving and choosing the norm consistent task to test our theory.4 We do,
however have plenty of liberals/Democrats that both perceive the norm and choose to
experience a cost in order to comply with the norm (63%).
We are now prepared to ask: What are the effects of experiencing a cost due to choosing the
norm consistent option? We are interested in the effect of experiencing a cost due to choosing
a norm and so we compare those that chose the norm-consistent task and experienced a cost
to those that chose the norm-consistent task and did not experience a cost. We would also like
to restrict our sample to those that perceived a norm and we would like to see how the effect
varies by the strength of this norm. We begin by looking at the effect on how much individuals
are willing (at a cost to themselves) to reward others with the same identity for complying with
group norms (i.e., choose the norm-consistent task). Figure 3 plots the effect at varying
strengths of the norm. The norm strengths are based on those that gave a score <5 (weak), <3
(moderate), and <1 (strong) on both the expected approval by others and the approval of
others for violating the policy norm from Task 1.5 The groups are mutually exclusive, so that if
an individual qualified for a norm strength category they are excluded from all weaker norm
strength categories.
We see that those that experienced the cost are more likely to reward liberals/Democrats like
themselves for complying with the norm. The effect magnitude increases with the strength of
4

In a related study conducted after this one we have used an incentivized task to measure normative beliefs of a
representative sample of US conservatives as well as the extent to which norms associated with conservative
identity vary across the age distribution (de Rooij, Kimbrough and Pickup 2018). We find that although the chosen
issues are normatively important for conservatives in general, this is less true among millennials, who make up the
bulk of the subjects in this study.
5
We estimate effects varying by policy norm strength with the following linear regression: $𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
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the perceived policy norm. Using a 0.05 one-tailed test, these effects are significant in two of
the three levels of norm strength. When the strength of the policy norm is moderate, the
magnitude of the effect is $0.47 and when the strength of the policy norm is strong, the
magnitude of the effect is $1.12. This increase in costly rewarding of norm consistent behavior
is 25 percent of the maximum possible reward.
Figure 3. Rewarding of a Norm Consistent Democrat/Liberal

Figure 4 plots how much individuals are willing (at a cost to themselves) to punish others with
the same identity for violating group norms (i.e., choose the norm-inconsistent task) at varying
strengths of the policy norm. We see that those that experienced the cost are more likely to
punish Liberals/Democrats like themselves for violating the norm. Again, the magnitude of the
effect increases with the strength of the perceived norm. The effect is significant at two of the
three norm strengths. When the strength of the policy norm is moderate, the magnitude of the
effect is $0.48 and when the strength of the policy norm is strong, the magnitude of the effect
is $1.17 (26 percent of the maximum possible reward).
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Figure 4. Punishment of a Norm Inconsistent Democrat/Liberal

Based on these results, there is evidence that complying with a group norm at a cost reinforces
that group norm (H1). Given that the individual’s choosing to pay a cost to reward norm
compliance and punish norm violations are the same individuals that already experienced a
cost due to their own choice to comply with the group norm, the evidence is compelling.
Next, we look at the effect of expressing a cost due to complying with a norm on the perceived
strength of a different norm. This is the norm: do not vote for the other side. We call this the
vote norm and it is measured as the expected approval of others (on a 0 to 10 scale) for voting
for a candidate of the opposite identity (a conservative candidate if the individual identifies as
liberal and a Republican candidate if the individual identified as Democrat). Figure 5 plots the
effect of experiencing a cost on the perception of this vote norm (measured in Task 3, as beliefs
about others’ approval) at varying levels of strength of the original policy norm regarding the
ACA/immigration (Task 1). The magnitude of the effect again varies by the strength of the policy
norm and is statistically significant at two of the three levels. When the strength of the policy
norm is moderate, experiencing a cost decreases the expected approval of others for voting for
15

a candidate of the opposite identity by 0.58 (on a 0 to 10 scale). When the strength of the
policy norm is strong, the magnitude of the effect is 1.59. A similar, but less pronounced effect
is observed for first-order normative beliefs (see Appendix A).
Figure 5. Effect of Cost on Norm against Voting for ID Inconsistent Candidate (Beliefs about
Others’ Approval)

There is moderate evidence that individuals that experience a cost because they chose to
comply with a norm of their political identity are more likely to perceive other group norms
more strongly (H2). Overall, the experiment provides evidence that experiencing a known cost
as a result of complying with the norms of one’s political identity increases the strength of that
identity and the norms of that identity. In fact, the cost increases the individual’s willingness to
experience an additional cost in order to punish and reward others in their group for violating
and complying with group norms.
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As a robustness check, we asked respondents how likely it was that someone with the same
identity would choose the norm consistent and inconsistent options. This is done to check that
individuals saw the choices regarding punishing and rewarding to be meaningful. For example,
if the individual indicated they would pay $0.50 to punish a norm-inconsistent
liberal/Democrat, they did believe there was a possibility they would have to pay this amount.
On choosing the norm consistent option, liberals and Democrats gave a score of 7.9 on a 1 to 10
scale. On choosing the norm inconsistent option, liberals and Democrats gave a score of 3.3.
The norm-consistent option was seen as more likely than the norm-inconsistent option.
However, only 2.9 percent (3) individuals felt that there was no chance of another
liberal/Democrat choosing the norm-inconsistent option.
As a second robustness check, we tested if experiencing a cost due to choosing the normconsistent option had an effect on liberals/Democrats punishing or rewarding
conservatives/Republicans. While we expect liberals/Democrats to punish or reward
conservatives/Republicans for their choice, our theory does not predict any effects from
experiencing a cost on these choices. We found no evidence of such effects.6 Note that if
punishment/reward decisions were driven by generalized inequality aversion (or some
preference defined over payoff distributions), we would not expect differential treatment of inand out-group members.7
As a sanity check, we looked at how perceptions of the policy norm predicted whether an
individual would choose the norm-consistent or inconsistent letter option. Among
liberals/Democrats, those that would expect disapproval by others (score <5) for violating the
norm were 23 percent more likely to choose the norm-consistent option. Those
liberals/Democrats that indicated they would disapprove of others for violating the norm were
36 percent more likely to choose the norm-consistent option. In other words, perceiving the
6

At the 0.05 (one-tailed) level, the only significant effect was that liberals/Democrats with the weakest perception
of a policy norm were more likely to reward conservatives/Republicans for being consistent with their own group
norms, as a result of experiencing a cost.
7
Models in which shared identity induces differential treatment of in- and out-group members via a change in
preferences (e.g. Chen and Li 2009) can potentially account for some of our observations. However, we know of no
model that predicts all of the following: 1) in-group (but not out-group) inequality aversion is triggered by normbreaking; 2) in-group (but not out-group) altruism is triggered by norm-following; and 3) these effects are triggered
by having incurred a cost for following the norm (and not just having followed the norm).
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norm increases the probability of selecting the norm consistent option. Interestingly among
conservatives/Republicans the corresponding numbers are 2.4 percent less likely (not
statistically significant) and 32 percent more likely. It would appear that amongst this group,
expected (dis)approval by others has little effect on choice. This underlines the problem we
have with our conservative/ Republican sample.

Conclusion
Social identities shape behavior in part because of the normative expectations shared by group
members, and to the extent that individuals care about satisfying these expectations (and
following group norms) they may sometimes incur costs as a result of doing so. We provide
experimental evidence supporting the idea of “effort justification” as a mechanism by which
such costly norm-following can be self-reinforcing. By randomly assigning the cost, conditional
on the decision to follow the norm, we are able to identify a clear causal effect of costly norm
following on subsequent punishment/reward decisions and normative beliefs. When individuals
incur costs to follow a norm associated with an identity group, they subsequently become more
willing to punish/reward other members of their own identity group. This happens despite the
fact that, if there are income effects in the decision to punish/reward, we would expect those
to work in the opposite direction of the treatment effect. Thus we provide evidence for an
important channel by which identity groups strengthen and persist over time: by encouraging
group members to follow norms (at personal cost), and thereby reinforcing the underlying
normative commitments.
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Appendix A.

Figure A1. Effect of Cost on Norm against Voting for ID Inconsistent Candidate (Own
Approval)

Figure A1 reports the effect of incurring the cost on own normative beliefs about the
appropriateness of voting for a candidate from the other party/ideology. As can be seen in the
figure, the effect of the cost is not statistically significant on own normative beliefs, but the
directional effect matches that for second order normative beliefs reported in Figure 5.
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